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AN EXPERIMENT ON RISK TAKING AND
EVALUATION PERIODS*
URI GNEEZY AND JAN POTTERS
Does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their in-
vestment in risky assets? Results from this study show that the more frequently
returns are evaluated, the more risk averse investors will be. The results are in
line with the behavioral hypothesis of “myopic loss aversion,” which assumes that
people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time, and are more sensitive to
losses than to gains. The results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle,
and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Benartzi and Thaler [1995] put forward an expla-
nation for the equity premium puzzle. This puzzle refers to the
fact that over the last century the risk-return relationship has
been so much more favorable for stocks than for bonds, that un-
reasonably high levels of risk aversion would be needed to ex-
plain why investors are willing to hold bonds at all [Mehra and
Prescott 1985]. The explanation for this puzzle, advanced by Be-
nartzi and Thaler, is called myopic loss aversion (MLA), and rests
on the combination of two behavioral concepts. The first concept
is loss aversion [Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman 1992], which refers to the tendency of individuals to
weigh losses more heavily than gains. The second concept is men-
tal accounting [Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Thaler 1985],
which refers to the implicit methods people employ to code and
evaluate financial outcomes.
The effect of combining these two concepts is perhaps best
illustrated by means of a well-known problem devised by Sam-
uelson [1963]. He asked a colleague whether he would be willing
to accept a gamble in which there are equal chances to win $200
and to lose $100. The colleague declined this single gamble, but
at the same time expressed a willingness to accept multiple plays
of the gamble. Although such a preference may have much intui-
tive appeal, Samuelson proved a theorem, saying that if the
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single gamble is rejected at every relevant wealth position, then
accepting the multiple gamble is inconsistent with expected util-
ity maximization (see Tversky and Bar-Hillel [1983] for further
discussion).
Benartzi and Thaler show that rejecting each single gamble,
but accepting a sequence of such gambles is consistent with MLA
(see Kahneman and Lovallo [1993] for a similar argument). If
returns are evaluated over a longer period of time, multiple gam-
bles become more attractive due to the lower probability that a
loss will be experienced. To illustrate, suppose that the individual
is characterized by loss aversion and has a utility function u(z) 5
z for z $ 0 and u(z) 5 2.5z for z , 0, where z is the change in
wealth due to the gamble. Then, the expected utility of one gam-
ble is negative: 1⁄2(200) 1 1⁄2(2250) , 0. Hence, the individual will
reject one gamble, and also two gambles—if each is evaluated
separately. The same individual, however, accepts two gambles if
(s)he evaluates them in combination: 1⁄4(400) 1 1⁄2(100) 1 1⁄4
(2500) . 0. Hence, rejecting a single gamble while accepting two
gambles is quite easily explained by the combined hypotheses of
individuals being more sensitive to losses than to gains and eval-
uating the outcomes of the sequence of gambles in combination.
As the example illustrates, MLA predicts that the dynamic
aggregation rules that people employ influence their attitude to-
ward risk. In particular, the period over which individuals eval-
uate financial outcomes influences their investments in risky
assets. By means of theoretical simulations, Benartzi and Thaler
show that MLA could thus provide an explanation for the equity
premium puzzle. In particular, they show that the size of the eq-
uity premium is consistent with investors evaluating their portfo-
lios annually and weighing losses about twice as heavily as gains.
However, Benartzi and Thaler do not present direct (experi-
mental) evidence for the presence of MLA. The evidence pre-
sented in Benartzi and Thaler is only circumstantial. Hence, we
seem to have a choice anomaly—a choice rule that departs from
standard theory—that could potentially explain an important
phenomenon. Yet, there are no direct and controlled tests that
indicate that the anomaly is real. Designing such a test is the
purpose of this paper.1
We have experimental subjects making a sequence of risky
choices. To analyze the presence of MLA, we do not try to esti-
1. Independently, Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz [1997] con-
ducted a similar experiment.
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mate the period over which subjects evaluate financial outcomes,
but rather we try to manipulate this evaluation period. In our
setup, two groups of participants are subjected to the same se-
quence of choices. Subjects in the first (high frequency) group are
supplied with feedback information after each round of the se-
quence, and can change their choice after each round. The sub-
jects in the second (low frequency) group, however, get feedback
information only after three rounds, and can only adapt their
choices after three rounds. If our design is successful in manipu-
lating subjects’ evaluation period, MLA would predict that the
low-frequency subjects make more risky choices. If subjects use a
longer horizon to evaluate outcomes, the trade-off between losses
and gains becomes more favorable for the risky option. At the
same time, subjective expected utility (SEU) theory does not pre-
dict a systematic difference in risk taking between the two treat-
ments in our setup.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section explains and motivates the design of the experimental
test, and spells out the hypothesis. Section III presents the re-
sults, and Section IV concludes.
II. DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Consider an individual who is confronted with a sequence
of three independent but identical lotteries, in which there is a
probability of 2/3 to lose $1 and a probability of 1/3 to win $2.50.
If, as is hypothesized by MLA, the individual weighs losses more
heavily than gains, then the attractiveness of the lotteries may
depend on whether the financial consequences of the gambles are
evaluated separately or in combination. For illustration, suppose
that the individual weighs losses relative to gains at a rate of
l . 1. Then the expected utility of a single lottery is (2/3)l(21) 1
(1/3)(2.5), which is positive only if l , 1.25. However, if a subject
evaluates the three lotteries in combination, then the expected
utility is (1/27)(7.5) 1 (6/27)(4) 1 (12/27)(0.5) 1 (8/27)l(23),
which is positive if l , 1.56. This is because the probability of a
loss decreases from 0.67 for a single lottery, to (0.67)3 5 0.30 for
three consecutive lotteries. If the financial consequences of the
three lotteries are evaluated in combination rather than sepa-
rately, then the lotteries should become more attractive.2 It is this
2. This prediction only depends on losses weighing more heavily than gains,
and not on the utility function being piecewise linear.
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basic prediction of MLA that we tested in our experiment, by ma-
nipulating the evaluation period of subjects.
In the experiment, subjects were confronted with a sequence
of twelve identical but independent rounds of a lottery (betting
game). In each of the first nine rounds (“part 1” of the experi-
ment), subjects were endowed with 200 cents.3 They had to decide
which part (Xt) of this endowment they wanted to bet in the lot-
tery (0 # Xt # 200, t 5 1, . . . , 9). In the lottery there was a proba-
bility of 2/3 of losing the amount bet and a probability of 1/3 of
winning two and a half times the amount bet. Subjects were fully
informed about the objective probabilities of winning and losing,
and about the corresponding size of gains and losses. It is im-
portant to stress that subjects could not bet any money accumu-
lated in previous rounds. Hence, the maximum bet in each round
is 200 cents, independently of the outcome of the bet in any of the
previous rounds. In rounds 10 through 12 (“part 2” of the experi-
ment) subjects were no longer endowed with any additional
money from the experimenters. Rather, they had to make bets
from the money earned in part 1. To that purpose, a subject’s
earnings in the nine rounds of part 1 were first totaled and then
divided by three. The resulting amount was a subject’s endow-
ment (S) for each of the three rounds of part 2. Again, for each
round a subject had to decide which part (Xt) of the endowment
S to bet in the lottery (0 # Xt # S, t 5 10, 11, 12).
The crucial feature of the design is that there were two differ-
ent treatments: Treatment H (high frequency) and Treatment L
(low frequency). In Treatment H the subjects played the rounds
one by one. At the beginning of round 1 they had to choose how
much of their endowment of 200 cents to bet in the lottery. Then
they were informed about the realization of the lottery in round
1. Only then could they decide how much of their new endowment
of 200 cents to bet for round 2, and so on. Hence, in this treatment
subjects made nine betting decisions in part 1 and three decisions
in part 2. In Treatment L, however, subjects played the rounds in
blocks of three. At the beginning of round 1, subjects had to decide
how much of their endowment of 200 cents to bet in the lotteries
of rounds 1, 2, and 3. In addition, these bets were restricted to be
equal. If a subject bet X in round 1, (s)he also bet X in rounds 2
and 3 (that is, X1 5 X2 5 X3, with 0 # Xt # 200). After subjects
3. At the time of the experiment, 1 guilder (100 cents) exchanged for about
US$0.60.
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decided on their bets, they were informed about the combined
realization for rounds 1, 2, and 3. That is, they could not assign a
gain or loss to any particular round, but only knew the aggregate
result. Subsequently, subjects decided how much to bet in rounds
4, 5, 6, and so on. Hence, in Treatment L subjects make three
decisions in part 1, and one decision in part 2.
In Treatment L subjects chose their bet for the next three
rounds; they had, therefore, less freedom because they could not
change their decision after every round. In particular, by the de-
sign of Treatment L we have Xt 5 Xt11 5 Xt12, for t 5 1, 4, 7, 10.
In Treatment H these equalities need not hold. Furthermore, the
subjects in Treatment H were supplied with more information
than were the subjects in Treatment L. When deciding on Xt, a
subject in Treatment H was always fully informed about the real-
izations and corresponding earnings of the previous rounds. A
subject in Treatment L, however, simultaneously decided about
Xt, Xt11, and Xt12 (t 5 1, 4, 7, 10). A subject had to decide about
Xt11 (Xt12) without knowing the realization for round t (rounds t
and t11). Hence, subjects in Treatment L were supplied with less
freedom and less information than those in Treatment H.
The basic idea behind the two treatments of our design is to
manipulate the evaluation period. In Treatment L the frequency
of choice and information feedback was lower than in Treatment
H. As a result, the subjects in Treatment L can be expected to
evaluate the financial consequences of betting in a more aggre-
gated way. If the subjects are characterized by MLA, this should
make them more apt to bet money in the lotteries.4
According to subjective expected utility (SEU) theory, there
may be a difference between a subject’s behavior in Treatment H
and Treatment L. This is so because, within each block of three
rounds, a subject in Treatment H has more information about the
current wealth level in the second and third round than does a
subject in Treatment L. A subject in Treatment H observes gains
and losses along the way, and, contrary to a subject in Treatment
H, can adjust bets accordingly. The effect of this additional infor-
4. In principle, it would be possible to draw conclusions from only part 1 of
the experiment. However, since the subjects receive the 200 cents endowment
from us, it is possible that they do not experience a lost bet as a “real” loss. In
part 2 of the experiment subjects bet their own money, “earned” in part 1. There-
fore, we expected that the impact of loss aversion (if at all) would be amplified in
part 2. On the other hand, in part 2 subjects’ wealth positions and experiences
are more diverse. Hence, in part 2 we may also expect to find larger individual
differences.
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mation cannot be unambiguously signed in general.5 In view of
the small stakes involved in the experiment, however, the effect
is likely to be small indeed. Hence, with the assumption that
wealth effects within each block of three rounds on subjects’ risk
aversion are negligible, the natural hypothesis under SEU is that
there are no systematic differences between average bets of the
subjects in Treatment H and Treatment L. This we use as our
null hypothesis.
Procedure
We had fourteen experimental sessions, seven for each of the
two treatments. The experiment was administrated by pen and
paper, and held in a seminar room with subjects seated far apart.
Six different subjects participated in each session (84 subjects in
total).6 Students were recruited from Tilburg University. An an-
nouncement in the university bulletin solicited participants for a
decision-making experiment of about 40 minutes, with a reward
that would depend on their decisions, but which was likely to be
somewhere between 5 and 35 Dutch guilders. For each session
eight subjects were invited; six would participate in the betting
games, one would act as an assistant, and one would serve as a
spare in case of a no show.
Upon entering the room, a short standard-type introduction
was read to the subjects by the experimenter. Subjects were in-
formed that the experiment would consist of three parts, but that
they would be informed about the instructions of part 2 only after
part 1 was finished. After the introduction, each subject drew an
envelope out of a stack. Six envelopes contained numbered regis-
tration forms for part 1 of the experiment; one envelope contained
a note with “assistant,” and one had an empty note (the latter
envelope was removed when only seven subjects showed up). The
assistant was told that he would receive a payment equal to the
average earnings of the other participants. The subject who drew
the empty note was paid f10 for showing up and was asked to
leave the room.
5. Gollier, Lindsey, and Zeckhauser [1997] derive sufficient conditions on the
utility function for this information effect to have an unambiguous sign. Trans-
lated to our setting, their results indicate that constant relative risk aversion less
than 1 would induce more risk taking in Treatment H than in Treatment L. Under
constant absolute risk aversion there should be no treatment effect.
6. As it turned out, we had one subject who was in the experiment twice. We
delete his second set of choices from the data, leaving us with 41 observations in
Treatment H.
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Instructions (in Dutch) for part 1 were distributed and read
aloud. After that, subjects could examine the instructions for a
few additional minutes, and (privately) ask questions.
Subjects were then asked to record their first bets. The lot-
tery was conducted by the assistant. To determine whether a sub-
ject gained or lost in a round’s lottery, we used private “win
letters” which were indicated on the Registration Form. For sub-
jects 1 and 2 the win letter was A, for subjects 3 and 4 it was B,
and for subjects 5 and 6 the win letter was C. We used different
win letters to introduce more variation in the realization of gains
and losses within each session. The assistant used a box con-
taining three disks marked, respectively, A, B, and C. After the
subjects had recorded their bets for the round, the assistant first
showed the contents of the box to the subjects (to show that the
box, in fact, contained an A, B, and C); (s)he then shook the box
and randomly took one disk out of the box. The letter on the disk
was the so-called round letter for the round. If a subject’s private
win letter matched the round letter, (s)he won in the lottery; if
the letters did not match, (s)he lost. Since there were three letters
in the box, only one of which matched a subject’s win letter, the
probability of winning in any round’s lottery was 1/3, and the
probability of losing was 2/3.
In Treatment L the subjects fixed bets for three rounds, and
three lotteries were conducted by the assistant. For that purpose,
the assistant used three boxes, each containing three disks la-
beled A, B, and C. The assistant first showed the contents of each
box to the subjects (to show that each box, in fact, contained an
A, B, and C); (s)he then shook the boxes and randomly took one
disk out of each box. The three disks drawn (one for each round)
were then shown simultaneously to the subjects.7 The letters on
the three disks drawn were the round letters for the present
three rounds.
After each round (three rounds in Treatment L), subjects cal-
culated and recorded their own earnings on their registration
form. We checked these calculations to make sure that they un-
derstood the procedure, and that they did not cheat. Then sub-
7. The main purpose of our design is to manipulate the evaluation period of
the subjects in Treatment L. We wanted them to evaluate three consecutive lotter-
ies in an aggregated way, without experiencing the losses and gains of each sepa-
rate lottery. Therefore, the outcomes of the three lotteries were shown to them
simultaneously. In this way it was not possible for them to attribute a gain or a
loss to any particular round in the block of three.
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jects recorded their bets for the next round (next three rounds in
Treatment L).
At the end of the nine rounds, total earnings were calculated,
and forms were collected. The experimenter divided these total
earnings by three to determine the starting endowment (maxi-
mum bet) for each of the three rounds of part 2. This starting
endowment (S) was indicated on top of the Registration Form for
part 2. These forms were distributed together with the instruc-
tions for part 2. The instructions were read aloud, and then the
three betting rounds for part 2 were held. Again, subjects calcu-
lated their own earnings. After it was finished, all subjects were
paid.8 The assistant was paid the average earnings of the other
subjects. That concluded the experiment.
III. RESULTS
Analyzing the results of part 1 is a straightforward exercise.
We simply compare the average percentage of the endowment (of
200 cents) bet in the lottery for the two treatments. To ease com-
parison, we take the average percentage of endowment bet in
blocks of three rounds. These averages and the corresponding
standard deviations (across individuals) are presented in Table I.
The final row of Table I gives the average percentage of endow-
ment bet over all rounds.
The results display a clear treatment effect. In each round
average bets are larger for treatment L than for treatment H. To
determine the significance of the differences, we use the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test.9 The final column reports z-
values, which are a transformation of the Mann-Whitney U-value
corrected for the presence of ties. These z-values are asymptoti-
cally normally distributed. The corresponding one-tailed signifi-
cance levels are also reported.10 The results indicate that the
difference in average bets is highly significant.
8. In fact, after part 2 was finished, there was a short supplementary part in
the experiment. In this part we tried to obtain additional information about sub-
jects’ risk preferences. This part, however, is not directly relevant to the present
test.
9. We cannot use the parametric t-test. This test assumes that the observa-
tions come from a normal distribution, which is not possible, given the lower- and
upper-bound of 0 and 100, respectively. Also, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects
the hypothesis that the observations are from a normal distribution.
10. We report one-tailed significance levels because the null hypothesis
(SEU) predicts no systematic difference, whereas the alternative hypothesis
(MLA) predicts that the bets in Treatment L will be larger.
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TABLE I
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF ENDOWMENT BET (PART 1)
Treatment Ha Treatment La Mann-Whitney zb
Rounds 1–3 52.0 (30.2) 66.7 (29.5) 22.08 [0.018]
Rounds 4–6 44.8 (30.0) 63.7 (30.3) 22.78 [0.003]
Rounds 7–9 54.7 (28.9) 71.9 (29.4) 22.51 [0.006]
Rounds 1–9 50.5 (26.7) 67.4 (27.3) 22.86 [0.002]
a. # obs. 5 41 (42) for treatment H (L). Standard deviations are in parentheses.
b. One-tailed significance levels (p-values) are in brackets.
It appears, moreover, that the average levels of bets are
fairly stable over the rounds. Although for both treatments bets
are somewhat lower in the three middle rounds, there is no clear
or significant pattern in the data. It is particularly noticeable
that the difference between the two treatments is significant al-
ready in the very first round (X1). Here, on average, the subjects
in Treatment H bet 50.1 percent of their endowment, whereas the
subjects in Treatment L bet 66.7 percent (the Mann-Whitney
z-value is -2.35 with a p-value of 0.009). It seems that the design
is effective in changing subjects’ attitude toward risk right from
the start of the experiment. This would suggest that subjects are,
at least to a substantial extent, forward looking when they evalu-
ate (“mentally account”) risky decisions. This seems to be in line
with Benartzi and Thaler, who formulate MLA in terms of “pro-
spective” utility. An additional hypothesis could be that experienc-
ing (not just anticipating) gains and losses affects subjects’ risk
behavior. For such a backward looking hypothesis we find no sup-
port. In the course of the experiment, the subjects in Treatment
H experience losses more frequently than do the subjects in
Treatment L. If this were a driving force behind the difference
between the two treatments, then we would expect this difference
to be stronger in the final round(s) than in the first round(s). No
support for this is found in the data. Moreover, we find no effect
of different experiences with gains and losses between subjects.11
The fraction of endowment bet is not significantly affected by sub-
11. For example, within each treatment we compared the bets of the subjects
who had just experienced a gain with those who had just experienced a loss. If
subjects were backward looking, we would expect the bets to be higher for the
former than for the latter group. The effect is in the other direction, however.
Although this finding is statistically insignificant, bets are larger after a loss than
after a gain.
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jects’ experiences with the occurrence of gains and losses in the
preceding round(s).
In part 2, subjects’ endowments were again identical across
rounds, but contrary to part 1, they differed across individuals.
In each of the three rounds, a subject’s endowment was equal
to 1/3 of his or her earnings (W) from part 1 of the experiment
(S 5 W/3). As a consequence, for each subject we have two vari-
ables of interest: first, the absolute amount bet, Y :5 ∑12t510 Xt(#
W), where for Treatment L we have X10 5 X11 5 X12, and, second,
the percentage of the endowment bet in the lottery, F : 5 100Y/
W. The averages of both variables are presented in the first two
rows of Table II.
It appears that the treatment effect is in the same direction
as in part 1. On average, subjects in Treatment L bet more in the
risky lottery than do their counterparts in Treatment H. Both
in absolute and relative terms, bets were larger if subjects were
supplied with less information feedback and less freedom of
choice. For the amount bet (Y ), the difference is again highly sig-
nificant. For the percentage of endowment bet (Y ), the difference
between the two treatments is less pronounced but still (margin-
ally) significant. As the final row of Table II indicates, the in-
creased willingness to take risks also pays off. Average total
earnings (parts 1 and 2) in Treatment L are significantly larger
than those in Treatment H.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a direct experimental test of the predic-
tion of myopic loss aversion (MLA), that a longer evaluation pe-
riod makes a risky option with positive expected return look more
attractive. Our results strongly support this prediction. We ma-
TABLE II
AVERAGE AMOUNT BET, AVERAGE PERCENTAGE BET, AND AVERAGE TOTAL EARNINGS
Treatment Ha Treatment La Mann-Whitney zb
Amount bet (Y) 707.3 (614.5) 887.1 (662.1) 22.14 [0.016]
Percentage bet (F) 39.0 (30.0) 48.9 (32.1) 21.62 [0.053]
Total earnings (parts 1 and 2) 1822 (1015) 2134 (745) 21.78 [0.038]
a. # obs. 5 41 (42) for treatment H (L). Standard deviations are in parentheses.
b. One-tailed significance levels (p-values) are in brackets.
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nipulated the evaluation period of one group of experimental sub-
jects by giving them less information feedback and less freedom
of adjustment than a control group. This manipulation was in-
tended to make subjects evaluate risky financial investments in
a more aggregated way. As a consequence, they are less likely to
be deterred by the occurrence of losses. In particular, we observe
higher earnings for the subjects who evaluate their investment
in a more aggregate way. The results provide support for Benartzi
and Thaler’s [1995] explanation of the equity premium puzzle.
The results may also have practical relevance. Manipulating
the evaluation period of prospective clients could be a useful mar-
keting strategy for fund managers. Our results suggest that pro-
viding investors with less frequent information feedback about
how a particular risky fund is doing might make the fund appear
more attractive by decreasing the likelihood that a loss will be
experienced. Similarly, if investors are given less freedom of ad-
justment (“tying their hands”), this may induce them to evaluate
financial outcomes in a more aggregated way, and help them to
resist the temptation to drop out after the occasional setback.
Of course, our experiment is highly stylized. For example,
the subjects in the experiment only face risk (known probabilities
of possible outcomes), whereas real-life investors mainly deal
with uncertainty (unknown probabilities). Another issue is that
our experiment took less than an hour, whereas the time elapsing
between real investment decisions is usually much longer. Fur-
thermore, the financial stakes for the experimental subjects are
low compared with those of most real-world decision-makers.
These features are a cause for caution in extrapolating of the re-
sults. They also suggest lines along which to pursue further ex-
perimental work.
APPENDIX: EXCERPT OF INSTRUCTIONS
(Translated from Dutch; full instructions are available upon
request.)
Introduction [Read aloud only]
Welcome to our experimental study of decision-making. The
experiment will last about 40 minutes. The instructions for the
experiment are simple, and if you follow them carefully, you can
earn a considerable amount of money. All the money you earn
is yours to keep, and will be paid to you, privately and in cash,
immediately after the experiment.
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The experiment will consist of three parts. The instructions
for the second part will be distributed to you after the first part
has been finished. The instructions for part 3 will be announced
at the completion of part 2. Before we start the experiment, how-
ever, you will be asked to pick one envelope from this pile. In the
envelope you will find your so-called Registration Form. This
form will be used to register your decisions and earnings. One
of you, however, will find the announcement “assistant” in the
envelope. This person will assist us during the experiment, and
will receive a payment that is equal to the average earnings of
the other participants in the experiment.
On top of your Registration Form you will find your registra-
tion number. This number indicates behind which table you are to
take a seat. A separate table is reserved for the assistant. When
everyone is seated, we will go through the instructions of part 1
of the experiment. After that, you will have the opportunity to
study the instructions on your own, and to ask questions. If you
have a question, please raise your hand, and I will come to your
table. Please do not talk or communicate with the other partici-
pants during the experiment.
Are there any questions about what has been said until now?
If not, then will the person on my left please be the first to pick
an envelope, open it, and take the corresponding seat.
Instructions for part 1 [Treatment H; Read aloud and
distributed]
Part 1 of the experiment consists of 9 successive rounds. In
each round you will start with an amount of 200 cents ( f 2). You
must decide which part of this amount (between 0 cents and 200
cents) you wish to bet in the following lottery.
You have a chance of 2/3 (67%) to lose the amount you bet and a
chance of 1/3 (33%) to win two and a half times the amount you bet.
You are requested to record your choice on your Registration
Form. Suppose that you decide to bet an amount of X cents (0 #
X # 200) in the lottery. Then you must fill in the amount X in the
column headed Amount in lottery, in the row with the number of
the present round.
Whether you win or lose in the lottery partly depends on your
personal win letter. This letter is indicated on the top of your Reg-
istration Form. Your win letter can be A, B, or C, and is the same
for all 9 rounds. In any round you win in the lottery if your win
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS642
letter matches the round letter that will be drawn by the assis-
tant, and you lose if your win letter does not match the round
letter.
The round letter is determined as follows. After you have re-
corded your bet in the lottery for the round, the assistant will, in
a random manner, pick one letter from a box containing three
letters: A, B, and C. The letter drawn is the round letter for that
round. If the round letter matches your win letter you win in the
lottery; otherwise you lose. Since there are three letters, one of
which matches your win letter, the chance of winning in the lot-
tery is 1/3 (33%) and the chance of losing is 2/3 (67%).
Hence, your earnings in the lottery are determined as fol-
lows. If you have decided to put an amount of X cents in the lot-
tery, then your earnings in the lottery for the round are equal to
2X if the round letter does not match your win letter (you lose
the amount bet) and equal to 12.5X if the round letter matches
your win letter (you win two and a half times the amount bet).
The round letter will be shown to you by the assistant. You
need to record this letter in the column Round letters, under win
or lose, depending on whether the round letter does or does not
match your win letter. Also you need to record your earnings in
the lottery in the column Earnings in lottery. Your total earnings
for the round are equal to 200 cents (your starting amount) plus
your earnings in the lottery. These earnings are recorded in the
column Total earnings, in the row of the corresponding round.
Each time we will come by to check your Registration Form.
After that, you are requested to record your choice for the
next round. Again you start with an amount of 200 cents, a part
of which you can bet in the lottery. The same procedure as de-
scribed above determines your earnings for this round. It is noted
that your private win letter remains the same, but that for each
round a new round letter is drawn by the assistant. All subse-
quent rounds will also proceed in the same manner. After the last
round has been completed, your earnings in all rounds will be
totaled. This amount determines your total earnings for part 1 of
the experiment. Then the instructions for part 2 of the experi-
ment will be announced.
Instructions for part 1 [Treatment L; Read aloud and
distributed]
Part 1 of the experiment consists of 9 successive rounds. In
each round you will start with an amount of 200 cents ( f 2). You
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must decide which part of this amount (between 0 cents and 200
cents) you wish to bet in the following lottery.
You have a chance of 2/3 (67%) to lose the amount you bet and a
chance of 1/3 (33%) to win two and a half times the amount you bet.
You are requested to record your choice on your Registration
Form. Suppose that you decide to bet an amount of X cents (0 #
X # 200) in the lottery. Then you must fill in the amount X in the
column headed Amount in lottery. Please note that you fix your
choice for the next three rounds. Thus, if you decide to bet an
amount X in the lottery for round 1, then you also bet an amount
X in the lottery for rounds 2 and 3. Therefore, three consecutive
rounds are joined together on the Registration Form.
Whether you win or lose in the lottery partly depends on your
personal win letter. This letter is indicated on the top of your Reg-
istration Form. Your win letter can be A, B, or C, and is the same
for all 9 rounds. In any round you win in the lottery if your win
letter matches the round letter that will be drawn by the assis-
tant, and you lose if your win letter does not match the round
letter.
The round letter is determined as follows. After you have re-
corded your bet in the lottery for the next three rounds, the assis-
tant will, in a random manner, for each of the next three rounds
pick one letter from a box containing three letters: A, B, and C.
For each of the three rounds a letter is drawn from a different
box. The three letters drawn are the round letters for the present
three rounds. If the round letter matches your win letter, you win
in the lottery; otherwise you lose. Since each box contains three
letters, one of which matches your win letter, the chance of win-
ning in the lottery in a given round is 1/3 (33%) and the chance
of losing is 2/3 (67%).
Hence, your earnings in the lottery for the three rounds are
determined as follows. If you have decided to put an amount of X
cents in the lottery, then your earnings in the lottery are equal to
-X for each round letter that does not match your win letter (you
lose the amount bet for the round) and equal to 12.5X for each
round letter that matches your win letter (you win two and a half
times the amount bet for the round).
The three round letters will be shown to you by the assistant.
You need to record these letters in the column Round letters, un-
der win or lose, depending on whether the round letter does or
does not match your win letter. You also need to record your earn-
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ings in the lottery in the column Earnings in lottery. Your total
earnings for the three rounds are equal to 600 cents (three times
your starting amount of 200 cents) plus your earnings in the lot-
tery. These earnings are recorded in the column Total earnings,
in the row of the corresponding rounds. Each time we will come
by to check your Registration Form.
After that, you are requested to record your choice for the
next three rounds (4–6). For each of the three rounds you again
start with an amount of 200 cents, a part of which you can bet in
the lottery. The same procedure as described above determines
your earnings for these three rounds. It is noted that your private
win letter remains the same, but that for each round a new round
letter is drawn by the assistant. The subsequent three rounds
(7–9) will also proceed in the same manner. After the last round
has been completed, your earnings in all rounds will be totaled.
This amount determines your total earnings for part 1 of the ex-
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